The Parliament of Canada has enacted a test of criminal responsibility, which test is expressly set out in Section 16 of the Criminal Code (1) . Section 16 reads as follows: "1) No person shall be convicted of an offence in respect of an act or omission on his part while he was insane.
2) For the purposes of this section a person is insane when he is in a state of natural imbecility or has disease of the mind to an extent that renders him incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of an act or omission or of knowing that an act or omission is wrong.
3) A person who has specific delusions, but is in other respects sane, shall not be acquitted on the ground of insanity unless the delusions caused him to believe in the existence of a state of things that, if it existed, would have justified or excused his act or omission. 4) Everyone shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to be and to have been sane." This test is a modified version of the M'Naghten Rules (2) laid down in 1843.
There have, throughout the years, been many critics of this test. One of the most persuasive of these critics is Dr. Gregory Zilboorg, who in his book, Mind, Medicine and Man (3) states that a psychiatrist might have this to say:
"Yet I must emphatically submit that I do not feel at home surrounded by a defence lawyer, a district attorney and the jury. They are all good and keen and eager to serve, and they all take their duties seriously and discharge them conscientiously. When they all individually and jointly ask me whether the defendant in the dock is in my°P OpInIOn insane, I must candidly state, if I am to remain true to my professional knowledge and faithful to my oath, first, that I do not understand the question, and second, that since I do not understand the question I do not know whether the defendant is insane or not. I admit the situation is embarrassing and puzzling to all concerned, but it is beyond my knowledge and power to remedy or alleviate it.
I know, of course, that in most communities the law assumes that any doctor of medicine should be able to answer this question, particularly a psychiatrist who has devoted all his professional interest to the study and treatment of mental disorders. Yet I must state not without dismay and regret that I cannot answer the question posited to me. The reason for my failure is simple. I do not know what 'insane' means. I know what a mental disease is, but 'insanity' or 'lunacy' as the law used to call it until not very long ago, is not a medical term, nor is it a psychiatric condition. True, it was explained to me that the court and the jury are not interested in determining whether the defendant is 'medically insane'; they wish to know whether the defendant is 'legally insane'. No doctor, no matter how learned and proficient he is in his professional work, is able to know whether a man is legally insane, because such a condition is unknown to him. It is not a psychological condition." (4) In 1956, the Royal Com-mission on The Law of Insanity as a Defence in Criminal Cases (5) reported in a 3:2 majority concluding that there should be no cha'nge in subsection (2) of Section 16 of the Code. The two dissenting Commissioners advocated a change in this test.
No matter what criticisms have been advanced, it is fair to say that most of us 512 are satisfied that there should be some test of criminal responsibility. Indeed, Lady Wootton, in her magnificent book Social Science and Social Pathology, (6) wrote:
"The idea that a man who is mentally deranged should suffer the penalties prescribed by law for criminal actions is generally accepted as repugnant to civilized feeling. Indeed in all the controversies that have raged around the application of the M'Naghten rules, it is remarkable how it has always been taken for granted that, if the presence of incapacitating mental illness can be established, then there can be no question of the law taking its course. Dispute turns only on the terms in which mental incapacity should in this context be defined, never on the question whether the sick should be exempted from the penalty imposed upon the healthy. The principle that any illness which causes misconduct also excuses that misconduct is certainly deepseated in contemporary notions of responsibility, at least as these are applied in practice." (7) New tests of criminal responsibility have been formulated in other jurisdictions, the Durham (8) and Currens (9) Rules among them, and each has in turn been the subject of criticism. It is not my intention to-day to consider the merits or demerits of any of these tests. Instead, I wish to devote my time to a consideration of a far more important problem-the ultimate disposition of the individual following the determination of the issue of criminal responsibility.
Where a Court finds that the accused did in fact commit the act with which he is charged and insanity is the only defence raised, it has only two alternative verdicts open to it. If the Court finds that the accused does fall within the prescribed test of criminal responsibility, it must convict. If, on the other hand, it is found that the, accused does not come within that test, the Court must acquit on the ground of insanity.
A finding of criminal responsibility in such circumstances and a consequent conviction will result in a sentence of either death or imprisonment. As Professor Desmond Morton put it in his able talk in the e.B.e. University of the Air Series (10) .
"'Criminally responsible' means no more than 'liable to be sentenced'." (11) While those who are acquitted on account of insanity are not liable to be sentenced, they are liable to be otherwise dealt with. The Criminal Code (12) provides in Section 523: "1) Where, upon the trial of an accused who is charged with an indictable offence, evidence is given that the accused was insane at the time the offence was committed and the accused is acquitted, (a) the jury, or (b) the judge or magistrate, where there is no jury, shall find whether the accused was insane at the time the offence was committed and shall declare whether he is acquitted on account of insanity. 2) Where the accused is found to have been insane at the time the offence was committed, the court, judge or magistrate before whom the trial is held shall order that he be kept in strict custody in the place and in the manner that the court, judge or magistrate directs, until the pleasure of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province is known."
The pleasure of the Lieutenant-Governor is invariably that the individual should be confined to a mental institution.
Weare therefore left with the situation that those who are acquitted on account of insanity are sent to mental hospitals and those who are convicted (failing the death penalty) are sent to prisons.
In 1871, Dr. Isaac Ray wrote: "Statutes were framed and principles of law laid down, regulating the legal relations of the insane, long before physicians had obtained any accurate notions respecting their malady; and, as might naturally be supposed, error and injustice have been committed to an incalculable extent under the sacred name of the law." (13) This quotation is particularly applicable to what I have to say about our present law and administration.
We send those who are acquitted on account of insanity to mental hospitals. In all cases such confinement is a non sequitur, even though in some cases the individual should be confined to a mental hospital.
Who is properly compulsorily confined to a mental hospital? The provinces of Canada govern the establishment, maintenance and management of mental hospitals (14) and have enacted legislation on these matters.
The Mental Hospitals Act (15) in Ontario, for example, provides that the individual may be certified by two medical practitioners (16). These medical practitioners must be satisfied that he suffers from a mental disorder to such an extent that he requires compulsory hospitalization. The hospitalization is for a condition that exists at that time.
An admission to a mental hospital subsequent to an acquittal on account of insanity is not as a result of the certificates of medical practitioners, but is based upon a Court finding, which finding may even be contrary to medical evidence. In effect' the test used for this admission is not whether the accused should properly be in a mental hospital, but whether or not he is to be held responsible for crime.
Furthermore, in the application by the Court of the test of the criminal responsibility, the vital time is the time of the commission of the prohibited act, which in practice is often weeks or months before. The finding of criminal responsibility or criminal non-responsibility is not a present finding. Indeed, any verdict which the Court hands down in this regard, pre-supposes that the accused was fit to stand trial, the only finding of present mental condition that a criminal Court makes.
It is, therefore, not surprising, that mental hospital authorities are sometimes bound to accept as patients, persons whom they feel should not be there.
The following report appeared in a newspaper in 1922:
"It is understood that an order will be made during the coming week transferring X, who shot and killed his sweetheart last May, and who was found insane by a jury on Saturday morning, to the Hamilton Asylum for the criminally insane. One of the experts who gave testimony to the effect that X is not insane and was not insane when he committed the crime was Dr.
Y., Superintendent of the Hamilton
Institution. Thus if X is sent there the doctor will have to accept the finding of the jury in regard to the man's sanity, and forget his own professional opinion on the subject." What should be done with the individual who is acquitted on account of insanity, and who appears to be well when the verdict is reached? A strong argument could be advanced for his release forthwith. I think society as a whole, would not easily accept such a release. While we do not want to punish this person, we are afraid of what he might do.
Mr. Justice Davidson of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec, stated the following in a case (17) decided in 1907:
"The theory in law, ..., is that the fact of having committed the offence puts him in the class known as dangerous or criminal lunatics. It insists that there should be full subsequent observation and enquiry as to whether his delirium, or his emotional state of mental irresponsibility has run its full course, in other words, whether the lucidity of mind which justified a trial was that of an interval, or permanent..." (18) If we are determined to confine him, we must decide where. Should we force him upon the mental hospital authorities who insist that he is not the type of person who, on medical grounds, belongs in a mental hospital?
We could confine him in a prison, but society would not tolerate that. He is not a criminal-he has been acquitted, albeit a qualified acquittal of crime.
Should we establish new, special institutions for these persons?
The problem is not easy of solution.
Another problem which arises is the disposition of certain persons who are found to have been criminally responsible. It is not inconsistent with the law to try and convict a person who is mentally disordered.
A Canadian court cannot under the law order a convicted person to be confined to a mental hospital. It is therefore the case that persons mentally disordered, even certifiably so, are being sent to prisons. That the judiciary is unhappy in this regard is illustrated by the following excerpt from a recent newspaper report. The Chief Justice of The High Court of Ontario, upon convicting an accused of non-capital murder, is reported to have said:
"I do not agree with the provisions that are made for those who suffer from mental illness. . . . These people of marginal cases are not treated with the humanity they deserve. . . . (He told the jury:) I thoroughly agree with your verdict, but I don't agree with the provisions that are made for those who may suffer...." The Chief Justice is reported to have 'bemoaned' the fact that there are no laws which would allow him to send the accused to a centre for psychiatric treatment.
Should our Courts be given the power to send such prisoners directly to mental hospitals? The British Mental Health Act, 1959 (19) , gives the English Courts the power to do so in certain cases. Some might disagree with such a course, inasmuch as they feel that it would do away with the concept of punishment.
A psychiatrist recently wrote: "A few years ago, a member of a prison visiting committee expressed great impatience at my description of a prisoner's state of anxiety and depression. He felt that the state of mind of a prisoner was unimportant; he was a different order of being who was in prison to suffer." (20)
One frequently reads of prison riots and flareups, These incidents are often attributed to prisoners mentally disordered.
An immediate answer to the problem of the mentally disordered prisoner is to transfer him from prison to a mental hospital. Legislation in Canada authorizes both federal and provincial prison authorities to transfer mentally disordered prisoners to mental hospitals (21). With respect to those convicted persons who become mentally disordered while incarcerated in prison, such transfers make good sense. But if a person going through the criminal trial process suffers from mental disorder (yet is still fit to stand trial), why send him to prison in the first instance, knowing he will not there receive the treatment he requires?
There are some who advocate the establishment of a special penal mental institution. The disadvantages of such an establishment are compelling. For example, how are we going to staff this institution? Will we lure psychiatrists away from mental hospitals which are now admittedly understaffed?
This problem is not easy of solution.
As I have already stated, a person who commits a serious act prohibited by law, will (failing the death penalty) be detained. It is the test of criminal responsibility which is, in effect, the sine qua non in determining the place of detention.
My submission is that it should not be the deciding factor. Whether a person is criminally responsible or not should only determine whether he is guilty or not. When the verdict of guilt or innocence is rendered, the question of criminal responsibility has run its course. Society, speaking through the Court, has declared whether the accused is to be held responsible or excused for his conduct; it has asserted itself.
Fresh criteria must now be imported to determine what should be done with the individual. Surely these criteria should be based on his mental condition at the time we are considering what should be done with him?
Under the non-criminal law, we rely on the doctors to tell us who is a proper person to be confined in a mental hospital. Surely they are the ones to ask which convicted persons and which persons acquitted on account of insanity, are proper persons to be confined in mental hospitals?
Which of the considered problems will my suggested approach solve? I am not embarrassed to say that it may solve none. It will, however, point out that we are doing the wrong thing. It will point out that we are clouding the real issues. To question our system is almost foolhardywe do what we are doing with such ease.
Chief Judge Bazelon, in his brilliant address in the Isaac Ray Award Lectureship Series (22) writes the following:
"The basic similarities between the prisons and mental hospitals are: 1) both are essentially over-sized dumping grounds for unwanted human beings; 2) both are substantially structured as institutions by society's niggardliness, and its basic desire not to be bothered; 3) faced with their overwhelming problems of size and resource, both end up being run primarily for the convenience of the organization-that is, manageability and good order take precedence over concern for the incarcerated human beings." A change in the test of criminal responsibility will not help us solve any problems in this regard. Canadian law is particularly complicated in these matters. The Dominion Parliament has exclusive legislative authority in the field of criminal law and criminal procedure. Penitentiaries are a federal concern; reformatories are governed by the provinces. Each province enacts its own laws in relation to mental hospitalization (23).
Throughout the years there have been in Canada, many Royal Commissions appointed, committees established and studies undertaken, to investigate problems with which we are here concerned. It is only fair to say that most of these undertakings have resulted in an advancement of our law and administration.
What is required is a comprehensive study encompassing all of the problems which arise in relation to crime and mental disorder. No one government department, indeed no one government, is either competent to undertake or capable of undertaking such a project. I find it disheartening when reading reports which have been made in the field of crime and mental disorder, to discover that the crucial issues have not been given any consideration because of limited terms of reference.
What, then, are desirable terms of reference? The following problems are only some of those which should be considered:
1) Who is properly in a mental hospital? 2) Do all persons acquitted on account of insanity belong in a mental hospital, or would it be better to confine some elsewhere and to release others? 3) Who is properly in a prison? 
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Mr. Swadron wields a sharp lance and has stabbed, or so it seems to me, the very heart of the problem. I am impressed when he says:
"If you tell me that the test of criminal responsibility should be changed and give me a valid reason for changing it, I will join you. But before you come to me and advocate change you must first decide what will be accomplished if such a change is made". He has drawn to our attention the difficulties under our present system which now face the Judges, defence counsel and the psychiatrists together with the demands of a stern relentless 'London, Ontario. society on the one hand, with her uneasy virginity on the other. And having commented, he has offered a tidy solution which would seem able to me to satisfy everyone including perhaps, even the accused. His solution is found in these words:
"Fresh criteria must now be imparted to determine what should be done with the individual. Surely these criteria should be based on his mental 'condition at the time we are considering what should be done with him." For those of us who appear in the Courts, Mr. Swadron makes sense. His quotation from the Chief Justice might well provide an invitation to this Seminar to go on record as passing and supporting such a resolution as he suggests. For about 100 years, we have made little progress in attempting to amend our test for criminal responsibility. Perhaps, his is our answer. The M'Naghten decision was in 1843. This is significantly recent when we remind ourselves that Freud was born in 1856 and died less than 25 years ago. Most criminal behaviour stems, I think, from man's inordinate desire for money, alcohol and sex and I am inclined to believe that the reason there is not more criminal activity is because of what H. G. Wells once called "man's fear of the policeman on the corner". When we consider the care and consideration we give to the breeding and raising of children compared to the care and consideration we give to the breeding and raising of pigs, the wonder is that we have been able to get along as well as we have. Some of this confusion can be seen in to-day's Criminal Code in which the following expressions are used:
Insanity, feeble mindedness, imbecility, delusional, mentally ill, disturbance of the balance of the mind and mentally deficient.
Perhaps Mr. Swadron's suggestion will also take care of some of the cases of arson or a thief who steals a brassiere, or a middle-aged female shoplifter or even some assault cases. Are all these people guilty of the crimes they commit or are their acts merely a manifestation oi some mental disarrangement? Is sending them to prison sufficient in 1963? This might be an easy solution for society but will they later repeat or will prison cure them? I think Mr. Swadron would answer no to the last question and if he does, I would agree with him.
Mr. Swadron quotes Section 523 of the Code and he does so because he assumes correctly that before there can be a judicial decision, the accused has to be found fit to stand his trial. It may be of some use to recall that there are 'two times' of insanity, if I can use that term; at the time of the commission of the crime and insanity at the time of the trial. Mr. Swadron quoted Section 523 and I think perhaps that I should remind you of Section 524 which says: 1) "Insanity at the time of trial. A Court, Judge or Magistrate may at any time before verdict where it appears that there is sufficient reason to doubt that the accused is on account of insanity capable of conducting his defence, direct that an issue be tried whether the accused is then on account of insanity unfit to stand his trial." 2) "Trial of issue. For the purpose of sub-section 1, the following provisions apply namely: (a) where the accused is to be tried by a Court composed of a Judge and jury, (i) if the issue is directed before the accused is given in charge to a jury for trial on the indictment it shall be tried by 12 jurors. (ii) if the issue is directed after the accused has been given in charge to a jury for trial on the indictment the jury shall be sworn to try that issue in addition to the issue on which they are already sworn. (b) where the accused is to be tried by a Judge or Magistrate he shall try the issue and render a verdict." 3) "Where the verdict is that the accused is not unfit on account of insanity to stand his trial, the arraignment of the trial shall proceed as if no such issue had been directed." 4) "Where the verdict is that the accused is unfit on account of insanity to stand his trial, the Court, Judge or Magistrate shall order that the accused be kept in custody until the pleasure of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province is known and any plea that has been pleaded shall be set aside and the jury shall be discharged." 5) "No proceeding pursuant to this Section shall prevent the accused from being tried subsequently on the indictment." I thought I might conclude my remarks by reminding you of the practical situation where a trial of an issue is involved. The issue in this case is the mental condition of the accused at the time of the trial. We commence with the presumption that the accused is sane and when the issue arises, the onus is on the accused then to prove that he is unfit to stand trial on account of insanity. This issue is decided by a jury and it is permissible for defence counsel and for the Crown to submit evidence of psychiatrists and others who can give evidence as to the condition of the accused at the time of the trial. If the jury decides that the accused is fit to stand trial, the trial proceeds; if on the other hand the jury decides that the accused is unfit to stand trial, the accused is remanded in custody to await the pleasure of the Lieutenant-Governor, which usually means he is sent to a mental hospital for the criminally insane such as Penetanguishene,
The problem which comes up of course is when the authorities at Penetanguishene come to the conclusion that the accused is no longer ill, he must then be sent back for his trial. The problem as I see it is that an accused may be unable to stand the stresses and strains of modern living mixing in society but may very well be fit to stand trial while he has been a patient in a mental hospital with its regulated and controlled type of life.
The other problem that comes up is the question of onus. Once a jury determines that the Vol. 9, No.6 accused is unfit to stand his trial, the onus then shifts from the defence to the Crown and the Crown must now prove that the accused is sane which is sometimes difficult to do.
When the accused has completed his trial of an issue and has been admitted to the hospital, before he can be tried again, there must be a second trial of an issue and it is at this trial that the burden falls on the Crown to convince the jury that the accused has recovered. The ridiculous situation it seems to me is that if the accused comes back and if the Crown is unable to discharge its onus, then the accused remains mentally ill and is returned to the mental hospital where the authorities are convinced that he is perfectly well. I mention this fact because there seems to be some confusion as to the proper procedure.
Another problem is, if the hospital says that the accused is able to stand his trial and he is returned to stand trial and goes through his trial and sets up the defence of insanity at the time of the commission of the crime and is acquitted, then under Section 524 of the Criminal Code, he would have to be returned to await the pleasure of the Lieutenant-Governor on grounds of insanity in accordance with the second part of Section 524.
The additional problem that arises is that when a patient has been found unfit to stand trial, he may be confined in hospital for a long time during which the witnesses may die and the evidence may be lost and the question of the alleged crime may never be able to be established and this, despite the fact that the Court has never decided whether the patient did in fact commit the act complained of.
I think that the whole problem of criminal responsibility has caused a lack of understand-ing on the part of lawyers to the great part which psychiatrists and psychiatry can play. The lawyers in the past have been suspicious of psychiatrists and no doubt still are because of their fear of surrendering the rights of the individual in our community to a sick minority.
An example of the divergence is that the law makes the following acts criminal: sale of contraceptives, incest, prostitution, possession of narcotics, homosexual activities, attempted suicide, euthanasia, abortions and gambling acts (unless of course they are for the benefit of a hospital in Ireland or conducted in a remote Church basement). The psychiatrists on the other hand take the position that these acts I have outlined may be criminal in the result but that neither explains nor helps the conduct, nor in fact does it get to the root of the problem of attempting to make some change in the behaviour of the individual or to correct his future acts, nor does his confinement to jail. When these acts, whether they should be crimes or not, are explained by your profession to the lawyers, convicting Judges and Magistrates, it may be that our problems will tend to disappear. Until that time, the solution suggested by Mr. Swadron may help to fill the breach.
It may be that there will never be a complete solution to all these problems but I think Mr. Swadron's suggestion gives us a glimpse down a brighter road although as I conclude, I must continue to remind myself:
"Young people who frequent picture palaces Have no use for psychoanalysis And tbo' Dr. Freud Would be very annoyed They cling to their long standing [allacies"
